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Executive Summary 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) enable investments in vital natural infrastructure upon which all humans 
rely. Unlike other types of infrastructure—for example, roads, bridges, hospitals, and educational systems—
ecosystem services often go unnoticed. These services flow from the natural capital stocks in all nations and 
regions, and range from dynamics that enable a relatively stable climate and reliable flows of clean water, 
through protection from storm surges and floods, and much more. 
As national governments become increasingly aware of the role that natural capital has in promoting the well-
being of citizens and nations, they have begun to turn to PES as a mechanism for driving investment into natural 
capital. The challenge to date has been to promote more PES transactions, particularly voluntary agreements 
beyond regulatory carbon trading regimes. 
This booklet has been created as an initial resource for public sector officials interested in fostering an 
environment in which PES transactions can occur. While PES legal and policy readiness is likely to look very 
different from one country to another—depending on legal frameworks, as well as historical and current 
circumstances and pressures—understanding policy options for getting ready for PES transactions is an 
important first step towards assessing readiness within a specific national and subnational context.  
This booklet offers an analytical framework for 
assessing legal and institutional readiness for PES 
transactions. It is divided into three sections based on 
timing and the order of addressing issues, with an eye 
to what will be most important to investors and 
buyers in payment for ecosystem services 
agreements. Specifically, the first level of preparing 
for PES agreements should be ensuring that 
fundamental or threshold conditions are in place for 
buyers to feel that there is sufficient stability in place 
to consider entering in these business arrangements. 
The second level of preparedness, while important 
for well-functioning PES, may be developed 
adaptively as needs and options become clearer via 
PES experience on the ground. Finally, level three 
includes non-urgent aspects that may be important 
to streamline or scale up PES, depending on the 
particular circumstances.  
Our intention in issuing this booklet is to offer public 
sector officials materials that can be used to identify 
options and gaps within in their particular legal and 
institutional contexts. This material is not a definitive 
guide or a set of policy prescriptions. Since PES policy 
and legal environments will vary greatly, what is 
feasible or attractive for enabling a legal and 
institutional framework will depend upon numerous 
political, economic, and other factors, which must be assessed in the specific national or sub-national context.  
We hope that this booklet will help to spur discussion around how to most effectively attract investment in the 
natural capital and ecosystem services upon which we all rely.  
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Glossary 
Commodity – a marketable good that has value and is fully or partially fungible with like goods. Commodity 
prices depend largely upon supply and demand, and less upon aspects of product differentiation such as the 
brand, perceived quality, etc. 
Ecosystem Services – the services and products provided to people by ecosystems as a result of dynamic 
processes involving living and non-living systems. They can be categorized as provisioning (e.g., food, fuel, fresh 
water), regulating (e.g., climate stabilization, water purification, air quality), cultural (e.g., spiritual enrichment, 
recreation), and supporting (e.g., soil formation, primary production) (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). 
Jurisdiction – the territorial range of the authority of one or more formally constituted governing bodies, which 
may be local, regional, national, or international. 
Leakage – displacement of impairments to ecosystem service functioning from inside PES project or program 
boundaries to external geographic areas. 
No Net Loss – a commitment or requirement that a development project result in no loss of ecosystem service 
functioning overall, considering on-site impacts as well as offsets. Generally, offsets may only be used after 
negative ecosystem impacts have been avoided to the greatest possible extent, minimized where unavoidable, 
and when remaining impacts have been appropriately mitigated or rehabilitated on site. 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) – broadly defined, voluntary transactions whereby an ecosystem 
services seller improves the delivery of, for example, carbon sequestration or other ecosystem services, in 
return for compensation from an ecosystem services buyer or investor. 
Reference Level – baseline status of ecosystem service functioning, potentially measured from historical levels 
or averages or projected business-as-usual. 
Registry – an official electronic record of names, transactions, project data, credit issuance, or other information 
related to PES activities. 
Reserve account – a separate amount of ecosystem services credits that are not offered for sale, but are held 
aside to make up for shortfalls under specific circumstances in the future. 
Security – a fungible, negotiable financial instrument that represents an interest in a company or entity.  
Tenure – the legal or customary relationship of an individual or group with respect to land and other natural 
resources such as water and trees. Tenure rules define how access is granted to rights to use, control, and 
transfer land, and associated responsibilities and restraint. 
Trading up – offsetting ecosystem services impairments with restoration elsewhere that yields more than 
equivalent ecosystem services functioning than what was lost. For example, a biodiversity offset that replaced 
lost habitat for equivalent habitat richer in threatened and/or valuable species might be considered to be 
“trading up.”  
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Introduction 
Ecosystems provide services that sustain life. Forests and wetlands, for example, regulate the climate, purify 
and deliver reliable flows of water, while also supporting the plants and animals upon which humans rely for 
food and fuel. These benefits are enjoyed both near the ecosystem and far away, where pollinators sustain 
agricultural production from year to year and downstream cities enjoy reliable water supply and protection 
from sudden floods. 
Replicating even a fraction of the services that are freely provided by well-functioning ecosystems would cost 
billions of dollars – if it could be done at all. Much of this natural capital is irreplaceable at any price. Yet, despite 
the value that ecosystems provide, many are being degraded faster than they can recover.1 Pollution, 
degradation, land-use conversion, selective removal of valuable plant and animal species, and other factors 
drive ecosystem service losses.2
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) represent one approach to enabling and incentivizing investments into 
functioning natural systems, the natural infrastructure of every country. These PES transactions place a 
monetary value on – and enable investments in – vital ecosystem services to help make sustainable resource 
use and management a competitive option for landholders. Over the past ten years, PES and related 
instruments have been steadily gaining traction as tools for preserving and enhancing the benefits of healthy 
ecosystems. 
 The results are felt, for example, in a changing climate, urban water shortages, 
and reduced resilience to natural disasters. 
 
PES and the Role of the Government 
As governments consider how to drive investment into natural capital and provide incentives for sustainable 
natural resource management, there may be a role for encouraging voluntary, private (between a buyer and a 
seller) PES transactions or even implementing PES measures at the government level. Reasons for government 
engagement with PES include: 
• Protecting and restoring well-functioning ecosystem can help to reduce costs, volatility, and conflict 
related to food production and water supply, among other positive benefits.  
                                                          
1 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment found that 60% of the ecosystem services examined were being degraded or used unsustainably. 
2 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 2010. 
Box 1. PES Example – Payments for Watershed Services in Gabon's Mbé Watershed 
The Mbé watershed provides water and electricity to Gabon's capital city of Libreville, which is home to 
60% of the country's population. Upstream forests – among the most biodiverse in Africa – play a key role 
in electricity production, helping to reduce siltation in the reservoirs and to regulate water flow through 
the hydroelectric dam. 
Forests in the Mbé are under threat from logging, mining, and subsistence uses. Controlling illegal 
exploitation and regulating legal uses are both important issues. In response to these threats, Gabon's  
Ministry of environment is working with Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) to set up a system of 
payments for watershed services.  The plan is for downstream electricity users to pay – indirectly, via the 
electrical utility – for the upstream adoption of land-use and -management practices that promote good 
functioning of the hydroelectric dam while protecting the ecosystem. 
Source: Filou 2009, www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/a/libreville_power. 
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• Where healthy ecosystems protect against storm surges and floods, they also directly reduce the 
economic cost of natural disasters and disaster relief.  
• Because effective PES should go to land users and managers, these payments also have the potential 
for poverty alleviation and development impacts.  
• PES can be structured to create investment opportunities for foreign entities and multinationals to 
support conservation and long-term sustainable development. 
• PES protect a country's natural capital, providing long-term benefits and contributing to sustainable 
development goals. 
A government that wants to support PES has a critical role to play in both highlighting the pivotal role of 
ecosystem services in national infrastructure as well as in fostering supportive environments in which PES 
transactions can occur. 
At present, however, there are few resources available to assist government officials in assessing domestic legal 
and institutional readiness for payments for ecosystem services and creating an enabling environment for PES 
transactions. While PES legal and policy readiness is likely to look very different from one country to another –
depending on legal frameworks, as well as historical and current circumstances and pressures – understanding 
policy options to prepare for PES is an important first step towards assessing readiness in a specific national 
context. 
 
Overview 
In response to this context and set of needs, this booklet seeks to provide a pathway forward for national 
government officials who are interested in starting to explore a supportive legal and institutional environment 
for PES. The booklet breaks assessment questions into three categories, based on timing and the order of 
addressing issues, with an eye to what will be most important to investors and buyers with regards to payment 
for ecosystem services agreements. Specifically, the first area of preparing for PES agreements should be 
ensuring that fundamental or threshold conditions are in place for buyers within PES agreements to feel that 
there is sufficient stability in place to consider such a business arrangement. The second level of preparedness, 
while important for well-functioning PES, may be developed adaptively as needs and options become clearer 
via PES experience on the ground. Level three includes non-urgent aspects that may be important to streamline 
or scale up PES, depending on the particular circumstances. 
Box 2. PES Example – Biodiversity Offsets in Madagascar 
The Ambatovy Project, a nickel mine in Madagascar, is working on avoiding and minimizing the impacts 
of its construction and operation on the island nation's biological diversity. The project is committed to 
restoring biodiversity losses that occur despite avoidance and mitigation measures, as well as to using 
biodiversity offsetting to achieve no net loss of biodiversity overall. Given Madagascar's high levels of 
endemism, the project is highly complex and, potentially, high-impact. 
Source: Berner et al. 2009. http://bbop.forest-trends.org/guidelines/ambatovy-case-study.pdf. 
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Figure 1. Factors for Assessing Legal and Institutional Readiness for PES Transactions 
 
 
 
This booklet may be used by policymakers to identify gaps and options within in their particular legal and 
institutional context, or by other stakeholders to assess PES opportunities. In practice, what is feasible or 
attractive in terms of concrete steps towards an enabling legal and institutional framework will depend upon 
numerous political, economic, and other factors. As with any major structural developments, finding sufficient 
political will is crucial.   
• No Prohibition on PES 
• Identifiable Supply and Demand 
• Governance Factors 
• Tenure Rights in Land 
• Rights in Ecosystem Services 
• Discernable Regulatory Regime for PES 
Level 1 - Threshold Conditions  
• Ecosystem Services Inventory 
• Methodologies for Measuring, Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification of 
Ecosystem and PES Outcomes 
• Registries 
• Public Participation 
• Technical Support 
Level 2 - Essential Aspects to Be Developed in Parallel with PES 
• Refining and Expanding PES Infrastructure 
• Facilitating International Investment 
• Dedicated Tariffs 
• PES Risk Mitigation 
Level 3 - Streamlining PES 
4 
Background – About PES Transactions 
Generally speaking, a PES transaction involves an individual or group that agrees to restore or maintain 
ecosystem services over time in return for payment. However, PES transactions may take various different 
forms, depending upon the ecosystem service(s) at issue, the identity and motivations of the buyer and seller, 
and the legal context, among other factors. One way to understand the range of different approaches to 
“investing” in ecosystem services is laid out in the figure below which distinguishes between PES based on 
policy or regulation and those that are voluntary business to business (B2B) or private transactions. 
Figure 2. Categorization for Environmental Markets3
  
 
The most common transactions at present relate to payments for:  
• Carbon emission reductions or removals, for example via the Clean Development Mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol (CDM) or the voluntary carbon market. In 2010, forest carbon market participants 
reported transacting 30.1 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e), worth about USD 
175 million.4
• Improved water quality or flow. In 2008, 288 identified payments for watershed services (PWS) and 
water quality trading (WQT) programs accounted for USD 9.3 billion worth of transactions.
 
5
• Biodiversity conservation or restoration. Compensatory biodiversity mitigation programs – including 
active mitigation banking or biodiversity credit programs, policies that channel development impact 
fees to biodiversity improvements, and one-off offset transactions – accounted for between USD 1.8 
and USD 2.9 billion in transaction value, or potentially even more, given difficulties in assessing market 
size for biodiversity transactions.
 
6
Buyers might be, for example, philanthropic or public interest organizations or companies that are seeking to 
mitigate their environmental impact for public relations purposes. Or they might be individuals or companies 
that have more pressing incentives to buy in that they are required to reduce or offset environmental impacts 
by law or they rely directly or indirectly on ecosystem service provision to maintain their business. For example, 
a water utility may find that upstream conservation and restoration is a cost-effective way to secure water 
 
                                                          
3 Waage and Stewart 2007. 
4 Diaz et al. 2011. 
5 Stanton et al. 2010. 
6 Madsen et al. 2010. 
Open Trading Schemes Markets that offer liquidity, transferability, low transaction costs and good access to information 
Public Payments Payments to property-owners who agree to adopt land management practices associated with the maintenance of environmental services 
Self-Organized Deals Individual beneficiaries of environmental services contract directly with providers of these services 
Policy or Regulation-Based Voluntary B2B or  Private Transactions 
Regulatory 
Markets 
Voluntary 
Markets 
Government 
Payments 
Government 
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quality, quantity, and/or flow. Sellers are likely to be individual land owners or managers or national 
administrative bodies in the case of state-owned or -managed land. 
 
Box 3. PES Example – Small-Scale Afforestation in Uganda 
Since 2003, a community in Uganda has been working with Ecotrust to create and sell carbon credits from 
the Trees for Global Benefits project. Participants plant trees on their land and the trees sequester carbon 
as they grow. Plan Vivo periodically assesses how much carbon is sequestered in this way and issues 
carbon credits (Plan Vivo Certificates) accordingly. 
A proportion of the credits from each participant's land are set aside as a buffer to insure against loss of 
sequestered carbon due to natural disaster or otherwise. In addition, Ecotrust collects 10% of credit 
revenues from each participant to contribute to a Community Carbon Fund. Money from the Community 
Carbon Fund can be used for projects that benefit the community, for example to manage natural hazards 
that threaten planted trees, provide short-term loans to community members, or to invest in watershed 
management, sanitation, soil conservation, or other projects. Buyers so far have been northern companies 
that are investing for pre-compliance or public relations purposes. 
Source: Vonada 2011, www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/a/trees_for_tots; Bayon 2005, 
www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/a/ugandan_teacher. 
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1. Threshold Conditions for PES 
While circumstances vary from country to country, certain threshold requirements exist for all PES transactions 
to occur. Generally, these thresholds refer only to minimum requirements, for example in terms of supply and 
demand, governance and regulatory aspects, and rights in land and ecosystem services. Beyond the absolute 
minimum levels required to support PES, additional strengthening in these fundamental aspects can be 
expected to further bolster PES. 
1.1 No Prohibition on PES 
If governments wish to promote or facilitate PES, there 
can be no explicit or implied prohibition on PES in any 
valid law or provision of the constitution. Such a 
prohibition most likely would not be a specific ban on 
PES, but rather a restriction or establishment of rights in 
ecosystem services that is fundamentally inconsistent 
with PES.  
For example, Article 74 of the Constitution of Ecuador 
(2008) says that ecosystem services may not be “appropriated” and that their production, provision, and use 
will be regulated by the national government. This article is generally interpreted to preclude PES from 
occurring without additional regulation and guidelines from the government. 
Often, PES is neither explicitly permitted nor prohibited by law. In such case, the challenge is in inferring rules 
and regulations that affect PES from relevant law related to, for example, forest and natural resource use, water 
rights, development, and other issues. These issues are discussed in more detail below.  
1.2 Identifiable Supply and Demand 
In order for PES of any kind to be viable, there must be 
supply and demand. That is, there must be: a valuable 
ecosystem service that is actually being degraded or lost 
(or whose degradation or loss is imminently threatened), 
and key stakeholders who perceive (or can be made 
aware of) both the value of the ecosystem service and 
the threat. Further, it must be possible for actions by 
defined individuals or groups to mitigate threats or 
prevent degradation and loss.  
To identify opportunities, it is therefore necessary to ask: 
• What are the ecosystem services at issue and who is benefitting from, or dependent on, continued 
ecosystem service provision? 
• What is the threat, whether current or likely degradation or loss, and what are the drivers? 
• Are beneficiaries aware of the importance of, and threats to, these ecosystem services? 
• What is the demand driver, e.g., incentives from international institutions, private sector expectations, 
actual conflict around the flow of ecosystem services, government incentives or restrictions, or others? 
In some circumstances, government intervention may be necessary for PES to take root because supply and 
demand are lacking. For example where the existence or value of ecosystem services is not perceived or the 
• No Prohibition on PES 
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benefits of ecosystem services are non-excludable, then market transactions in those ecosystem services are 
unlikely to occur, absent some kind of government requirement or other intervention.7
 
 
1.3 Governance Factors 
PES readiness is not dissimilar to readiness for other 
investments, including the fact/idea that PES investors 
require minimum governance factors, particularly in 
terms of enforcement of contracts and basic rule of law. 
That is, minimum levels of governance are required in 
order for there to be investment demand for PES. 
Beyond minimum levels, improved governance plays a 
major role in facilitating stable PES projects and 
programs and attracting additional funding. 
Because PES transactions are highly dependent on contracts, which outline the parties’ rights and 
responsibilities, access to courts and enforcement of contracts are particularly important aspects of PES 
preparedness. Other governance factors that are relevant include:  
• Public participation;  
• Transparency; 
• Access to information;  
• Accountability; and  
• Rule of law.8
Without minimum levels of governance in place, PES investments will be perceived as too risky, crippling 
demand for PES. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Salzman 2009, 22-23. 
8 World Bank Doing Business Project 2010. 
Box 4. Potential Government Actions to Spur Supply and Demand 
If government intervention to spur or create PES supply or demand is needed, the type of intervention 
that is likely to be necessary and sufficient will vary greatly from case to case. Numerous potential options 
exist, including:  
• Targeted awareness-raising campaigns around ecosystem service value and threats. 
• Organizing supply and demand via centralized listing, exchange, or otherwise. 
• Mandatory environmental impacts reporting for certain development or land-use activities that 
require assessing impact over ecosystem services. 
• Requirements to maintain or offset ecosystem service loss in connection with development 
projects (e.g., “no net loss” of biodiversity). 
• Subsidies for conservation activities, which may be funded by general taxes or by resource usage 
fees or targeted tariffs. 
• Comprehensive offsets, trading, or mitigation banking programs. 
• No Prohibition on PES 
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• Rights in Ecosystem Services 
• Discernable Regulatory Regime for PES 
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1.4 Tenure Rights in Land 
On the supply side, at least some potential sellers must 
have clear and secure tenure rights sufficient to support 
PES activities. Tenure rights do not necessarily mean 
private ownership, but rather secure, clear, long-term 
rights to possession, use, management, and potentially 
transfer of land use rights. Relevant rights can be 
subdivided into the rights that a potential PES seller must 
have (1) in the land and natural resources at issue, as 
well as any inputs (such as seedlings, fertilizer, machinery, raw materials) into PES activities, and (2) in the 
ecosystem services (or credits for ecosystem services) generated by the PES project. This section will discuss 
rights in land and natural resources, while the following section discusses rights in ecosystem services. 
Parties to a PES agreement who lack minimum rights in the project area or natural resources cannot guarantee 
that project activities will continue as promised, creating the risk that ecosystem services will not be delivered 
and that a PES arrangement will be abandoned. The necessary “minimum rights” in the particular case will 
depend a great deal upon the legal context, but can be said to at least include use rights sufficient to perform 
the project activities and the right to exclude or prohibit incompatible uses. Take for example the case of a PES 
seller involved in tree-planting in order to sequester carbon. That seller must have the right to use the land for 
tree planting, as well as the right to prohibit others from cutting or destroying trees within the project area. 
The reality, however, is that there is often a lack of clarity in land rights in many places, making it challenging to 
determine who, if anyone, is the rightful PES seller. Therefore, governments have a real opportunity to clarify 
rights in land and natural resources in order to pave the way for PES. 
A few options for potential government action include: 
• Facilitating land titling or formalization of land use rights, either alone or as part of a government 
program to facilitate or encourage PES. Formalization of land-use rights may occur at a national or 
more local level. 
• Establishing or utilizing mechanisms for granting secure land-use rights in state-owned lands, for 
example via a conservation concession or similar instrument. 
• Streamlining registration of titles or use rights and facilitating access to these records. 
• Providing training and/or resources related to obtaining and registering title or use rights and 
resolving tenure conflicts. 
Another option is to choose to implement or incentivize PES only in those areas where tenure is clear. However, 
this approach (1) may exclude high-priority ecosystems that are held under insecure tenure, and (2) may risk 
disproportionately benefitting the rich, who often have more secure rights in land. Therefore, to the extent that 
this approach is taken, non-PES measures should be considered in parallel to ensure that high-priority 
ecosystems are also preserved and restored, although they are ineligible for PES, and to address equity 
dimensions. 
State ownership of land creates different issues and options for allocating rights. State-owned lands are in some 
places prone to resource overexploitation.9
                                                          
9 Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Porter-Bolland et al. 2011. 
 One potential cause, where this is the case, is that local resource 
users of public lands lack secure, long-term rights in the area and therefore have no incentive to limit current 
use in order to preserve the area over the long-term.  
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On the other hand, governments also have considerable opportunity for PES on public lands, either via state-
run programs or systems of allocating use rights that are compatible with, or conducive for, PES. For example, 
conservation concessions or collaborative natural resource management structures may be used to grant rights 
in state-owned lands that can support private PES transactions. As governments typically own large areas of 
forests, rich sources of ecosystem services, this can be a major issue. 
 
1.5 Rights in Ecosystem Services 
Clear rights in specific ecosystem services are a related 
but distinct issue from land tenure rights. For PES 
transactions that involve a purchase of credits for 
ecosystem services or similar instruments (as opposed to 
land management services), the ecosystem services must 
legally be able to be transferred separately from their 
source. They might, for example, be considered as a type 
of intangible good. In this type of transaction, the seller 
must “own” the ecosystem services and must have a 
right to transfer them without selling the land itself or the natural resources on the land. 
The law may implicitly or explicitly provide for who has rights in ecosystem services. The Forestry Law of Peru, 
for example, recognizes that administrative authorizations to use forest resources include rights in economic 
benefits derived from ecosystem services. 
Where the law does not specifically refer to rights in, or ownership of economic benefits from ecosystem 
services, they might, for example belong to:  
(1) A private owner as part of his or her rights in land,  
(2) The nation as a whole, and might be granted to project participants via an approval letter coming from 
the government, or 
(3) Those with rights in the natural resources on the land (i.e., timber rights).10
For government officials interested in supporting, or incentivizing, more PES transactions in-country, the law 
should specifically speak to the question of the nature of ecosystem services and rights in ecosystem services 
 
                                                          
10 Curnow 2009. 
Box 5. Tenure, Social Risks, and Safeguards 
There are several tensions inherent to the topic of tenure and PES. One is the tension between the need to 
clarify or eliminate restriction of land rights, including by foreign entities, and the need to safeguard 
against land grabs and displacement.  
Simplifying and streamlining land ownership can facilitate PES and make PES more accessible. Yet, it can 
also facilitate land grabs by powerful people or entities, who seek to capture PES revenues. Similarly, 
recognizing de facto rights can increase accessibility and equity, but can also create challenges in terms of 
titling, recording, and consultation. 
Potential unintended consequences, or policy perversities, should be carefully considered prior to 
definitive policy action. 
Sources: Curnow 2009; Greiber 2009. 
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(or economic benefits derived from ecosystem services) in order to provide the clarity needed for participants 
to engage in PES. 
1.6 Discernable Regulatory Regime for PES 
The restrictions and requirements that will apply to PES 
transactions need to be discernable. That is, there should 
be a minimum level of clarity as to: 
• Which regulatory entities have jurisdiction over 
PES activities; 
• What are the contours of their powers; and 
• What formal approval or registration processes 
(and associated fees), if any, are involved. 
If tradable credits are used, the regulatory regime that applies is likely to differ if they are classified as a 
commodity, a security, or something else.11
In general, commodities regulation is less restrictive than securities regulations and is likely to provide a more 
clear, efficient, and accessible framework for PES. Commodities and securities are broad categories, however. 
Depending on how they are created and sold, credits for ecosystem services might be further subcategorized, 
with consequences for their regulatory treatment.  
 For a government that is interested in facilitating ecosystem 
services transactions, clarity in how ecosystem services credits will be regulated, and therefore what taxes and 
fees will apply, will be important to providing clarity and certainty to potential participants. Note that 
commodities or securities regulation, whichever is applicable, has implications for any project or program 
involving PES credits, whether public or private, compliance, or voluntary. 
To the extent that the legal nature of ecosystem services credits is not defined, PES contracts must account for 
substantial uncertainty in future taxation and other regulatory treatment. This uncertainty is likely to translate 
into lower and more volatile credit prices. In addition, project developers may have difficulty in obtaining 
project finance to the extent that revenues are less certain. 
Taxes that may apply to PES credit transactions include: 
• Sales and value-added (VAT) taxes that are charged when credits are transferred and that are based on 
credit value, if credits are defined as an intangible asset (Curnow 2009).  
• Duties or tariffs on credits that are exported from the host country and imported into another country. 
Other tax implications for PES activities are applicable regardless of whether credits are used or how they are 
classified, such as: 
• Personal and corporate income tax on PES income, which may be subject to withholding at the non-
resident rate for foreign project developers. Note also that revenues may be treated as capital receipts 
that are subject to capital gains tax rates. 
• Property taxes, based on the value of the land, which may increase due to the potential for, or actual 
occurrence of, PES on that land. 
• Indirect taxes on goods and services that are used in PES activities. 
                                                          
11 It has been proposed that ecosystem services credits should be treated as, and regulated, as a currency. So far, this construct remains 
purely theoretical, however. 
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A minimum level of clarity in terms of the regulatory structure for PES, including which authorities have 
jurisdiction over PES regulation, is a threshold requirement for PES to occur. Otherwise the level of uncertainty 
– particularly for potential international buyers, who may be subject to export taxes – is too great. Beyond 
minimum levels, additional clarity will help to facilitate PES. 
12 
2. Essential Aspects to Be Developed in Parallel with PES 
Beyond threshold requirements for PES, there are aspects of the institutional framework that are needed in 
order to systematize or scale up PES and/or to increase clarity and efficiency of transactions. Anything beyond 
one-off PES transactions requires aspects of supportive institutional infrastructure. 
Institutional aspects are incredibly important for PES to happen at scale. Yet, they do not need to be in place or 
perfected in order for PES activities to begin to occur; instead, they can be developed in parallel with PES in an 
adaptive learning approach. That is, formal and technically-sophisticated elements of a supportive institutional 
framework can be developed and refined as PES experience grows.12
2.1 Ecosystem Services Inventory 
 
Underlying every PES transaction is a shared 
understanding about the value and distribution of 
ecosystem services. Ecosystem service inventory, as 
well as valuation assessments, forms the basis of 
ecosystem services baselines from which PES 
progress can be measured and also informs strategic 
conservation planning. If national, or even sub-
national assessments are not feasible, however, 
many projects can (and do) move forward on a 
project-only assessment basis, including site-specific data, baselines, and measurement protocols over time. 
Whether they are at national, subnational, or local levels, these baselines, or reference levels, represent current 
or projected future ecosystem service provision absent PES project activity. Having an accurate baseline helps 
to determine whether, and to what extent, PES activities succeed in delivering promised ecosystem services 
benefits. Baselines may be constructed in a number of different ways – each project my establish a baseline, 
based on a unique or a shared methodology (bottom-up), or a baseline may be established at the regional or 
national level and allocated among projects within the relevant area (top-down). 
In either case, creating a baseline requires adequate, consistent classification of ecosystem types and services. 
Inventory and mapping might reveal levels and types of services that are delivered under alternative land 
management regimes, indicate the degree to which ecosystem service supply is spatially congruent, and help to 
forecast changes in services and societal needs in the future. Assumptions must be clearly stated to make the 
process transparent and allow for updating as new information is developed. 
Robust mapping of ecosystem services is also useful for priority-setting at the government level. In every 
country, conservation must be balanced against competing demands on land and natural resources and 
coordinated with economic development activities. Strategic conservation planning and economic-ecological 
zoning are needed to identify areas of high conservation (and/or ecosystem service) value and to support 
“trading up” in the case of biodiversity offsetting. 
Building off of robust ecosystem service mapping and valuation, economic-ecological zoning can be used to 
systematically identify priority areas for ecosystem service provision and different types of economic 
development activities. Practically, ecosystem conservation and restoration cannot come at the expense of 
production and economic development. The process of comprehensive economic-ecological zoning allows 
governments and PES participants to make educated decisions about which ecosystems are priority areas for 
                                                          
12 For more information about institutional actors and aspects of the institutional framework, see Waage et al. 2008, http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_2347.pdf.  
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conservation and restoration and which are priority areas for productive activities, extractive industries, or 
other types of economic activity that may clash with conservation goals. In priority areas for production, for 
example, intensification might allow for preservation or restoration of prime habitat that would otherwise be 
degraded by scattered, low-yield farms. 
Furthermore, strategic conservation planning that builds off of ecosystem service inventory and valuation can 
reveal opportunities to combine ecosystem management for conservation with other goals, such as low-impact 
agriculture or aquaculture, storm protection or erosion control, in order to access additional financial flows. 
2.2 Methodologies for Measuring, Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
Whether they are engaging in PES to satisfy a legal 
obligation, are pursuing public relations or philanthropic 
goals, or are securing their supply chain, buyers are 
seeking to secure real ecosystem services outcomes. In 
other words, PES transactions are conditional on 
ecosystem service delivery or on the maintenance of 
ecosystem structure and function that is very likely to 
result in expected ecosystem services flows.  
Therefore, the availability of guidance around measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification (MMRV) of 
progress from a baseline level of ecosystem service provision is an important aspect of a supportive institutional 
framework. Overarching guidance for, or regulation of, MMRV can be expected to increase transparency, 
accuracy, and certainty and also to reduce transaction costs. Key questions to be addressed in such guidance 
are: 
• What ecosystem services are recognized and how is improvement or deterioration in these ecosystem 
services measured? 
• What set of activities does MMRV include with respect to these ecosystem services? 
• When, how often, and by whom are these activities performed? 
• What are the geographical limits of MMRV? How, if at all, are impacts outside of these geographical 
limits to be taken into account? 
• What will be considered to be ecologically equivalent (biologically, geographically, etc.) for purposes of 
offsetting? What will be considered to be “trading-up”? 
Overarching guidance on these and other MMRV issues will help institutionalize consistent assumptions and 
methodologies across different projects or activities, lending transparency, accuracy, and legitimacy to PES 
activities overall. Consistent MMRV will also reduce administrative and transaction costs as regulators and PES 
participants avoid duplicating efforts in designing, implementing, and assessing MMRV. 
The government’s role in MMRV may involve endorsing, supporting, or even helping to develop third-party 
MMRV methodologies or the internal development and promulgation of MMRV guidelines or regulations. 
Guidance on this issue might cover only basic issues – such as clearly defining ecosystem services and their 
measurement – or may be comprehensive. Existing methodologies – such as those developed for the CDM and 
voluntary carbon markets or the biodiversity offset methodologies developed by the Business and Biodiversity 
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Offsets Program (BBOP) – can inform the process of MMRV guidance development or even be endorsed 
wholesale.13
2.3 Registries 
 
PES registries are another important aspect of a 
supportive institutional framework. In practice, a PES 
registry will be an electronic database containing 
information on projects, transactions, tradable 
ecosystem services credits, and potentially other 
information. Using a registry makes it possible to track 
ecosystem service transactions, avoid double-counting of 
ecosystem service benefits, and to hold participants 
accountable. In order for this data aggregation and 
dissemination to be effective, however, it should happen at the national (or, potentially, regional) level, 
whether implemented by the government itself or by an independent non-governmental body. 
The registry may serve multiple different functions, such as: 
• Capturing geographical information on where projects are located. 
• Registering PES participants and associated PES activities. 
• Displaying environmental, social, technical, or other criteria applicable to projects. 
• Tracking performance of PES activities. 
• Recording PES credit issuance or payments made. 
• Issuing and tracking tradable PES credits.14
In addition, the registry might be connected to or cross-referenced with the system of land titles, providing 
more certainty around tenure issues in PES. PES registries can be implemented in phases, serving basic project 
tracking functions at first and increasing in complexity and interconnectedness over time. 
 
2.4 Public Participation 
Another key aspect of a supportive institutional 
framework is the presence of effective structures and 
processes for consultation and information 
dissemination.15
This component supports free, prior and informed 
consent from indigenous peoples, as required by the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as 
well as other stakeholders. It is also an important safeguard for small-scale, rural, and community interests in 
particular, which might be underrepresented in national dialogues. 
 Relevant laws and regulations should be 
circulated for public comment prior to enactment and 
publication, and there should be processes for receiving 
and responding to stakeholder concerns and complaints. 
                                                          
13 For more information about MMRV, see Diaz  and Delaney 2011; Gammie and Olander, forthcoming January 2012; Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Program, forthcoming January 2012. 
14 Olander et al. 2010. 
15 Note also that information sharing and early dialogue is 1b, and consultation and participation process is 1c of an R-PP under the FCPF 
(Lotsch 2011). 
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Further, public consultation supports project and program design that is more effective because it is well-suited 
to relevant needs, opportunities, and barriers. At the same time, information dissemination, including training, 
enables various stakeholders to participate in PES with a full understanding of their rights, responsibilities, and 
options, enhancing the efficacy of PES projects. Civil society and international organizations can be key partners 
in this area, helping to disseminate information, conduct trainings, and facilitate stakeholder consultation. 
2.5 Technical Support 
PES transactions are complex and, often, not well-
understood. Stakeholders of all kinds may have little or 
no experience with these unique market interactions. 
The availability of technical support, whether through 
the government, civil society, or the private sector, is 
therefore a key aspect of a supportive institutional 
framework. 
Technical support may be provided directly by the 
government, by civil society, by the private sector, or a combination of these. It can take a number of forms, 
such as trainings, information dissemination, or direct technical assistance during key phases of project 
development or implementation. Whatever the form or the provider of technical support, the government has 
a role in making sure that reliable support is available and accessible and that providers are accountable to PES 
participants for misrepresentations or fraud. 
The government could, for example, enter an agreement with a private or civil society organization to provide 
trainings, information, or direct technical support. Building up relevant organizational capacity and providing 
basic information and trainings could be funded by the government. Direct technical support could be paid by 
PES participants out of future PES revenues. Of course, many other arrangements are possible. 
The government may also have a role to play in organizing PES supply and demand. In nascent markets like 
those for PES, mismatch of supply and demand can be a big problem, with short-term implications for PES 
participants and potentially long-term impacts on market engagement. Where adequate demand and supply 
exist, it may simply be a matter of deal brokering – matching willing sellers with willing buyers – which may be 
done by the government or by a private entity. Or it might be a matter of queuing up sufficient supply prior to 
launching a PES initiative, or of getting the word out to prospective buyers or sellers so that they can opt-in.  
In all cases, infrastructure to manage supply and demand can be useful to ensure that the most promising PES 
deals come to fruition, even where one or both sides is not initially aware that mutually beneficial opportunities 
exist. 
Box 6. Community Participation and Free Prior Informed Consent – the Surui 
The Surui-Paiter of Rondônia, an indigenous group of approximately 1,300 people with legal rights to 
248,147 ha in the Brazilian Amazon, have been on the vanguard of participatory, community-based 
REDD+. The principles of consultation, consent, and equity have been central to the process of planning 
and developing the Surui REDD+ project. Today, after more than two years of participatory consultation, 
planning, and project development, involving many community and leadership meetings, the project is on 
the verge of selling carbon credits on the voluntary market. In accordance with the 50-year plan 
established by the Surui, revenues will be shared equitably among the Surui communities. 
Source: Olander et al. 2010. 
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3. Streamlining PES 
Beyond threshold requirements and basic elements of the supportive institutional infrastructure, measures 
may be taken to streamline PES, maximizing overall returns and providing social and economic safeguards for 
PES participants. 
3.1 Refining and Expanding PES Infrastructure 
As PES experience grows and develops, it will become 
clear what additional changes are needed to the legal 
and institutional framework to streamline and 
facilitate more (or more desirable socially, 
environmentally, economically, or otherwise) PES 
transactions in a particular context. Additional 
investment may be needed, for example, in MMRV, 
registries, technical support, or other aspects based on barriers and opportunities for PES in that jurisdiction.  
Assessing these needs and making additional changes is part of the adaptive learning process. Certain aspects of 
the supportive institutional framework must be present in basic form to begin to scale up PES, but can be 
refined and formalized in tandem with growing PES experience.  
3.2 Facilitating International Investment 
If foreign commercial investment or purchases are 
meant to play a substantial role in funding PES, 
certain regulatory restrictions may be clarified or 
eliminated. For example, a government might: 
• Simplify (or eliminate) foreign exchange 
controls that apply to credit transactions 
where payments are made in currencies 
other than that of the host country, as these highly jurisdiction-specific controls undermine 
transparency and may deter foreign investment. 
• Simplify or provide clarity around foreign direct investment restrictions or special legal requirements 
for foreign investors. 
• Provide clarity around credit-pricing controls, if these are used. 
Additionally, governments may simplify and/or provide clarity around the rules of the game in terms of special 
restrictions and rules for foreign investors. 
Restrictions on foreign investors are likely to be very relevant for certain types of PES – carbon and biodiversity 
more than water, perhaps – that are well-suited to international deals. These restrictions can be politically 
attractive, particularly in terms of retaining domestic ownership and control over land and key industries and 
keeping PES profits in-country, and may be used as a safeguard against foreign speculation in land. Naturally, 
they also deter or prohibit a certain amount of foreign investment.  
The balance between facilitating investment in PES and maintaining domestic control over resources and PES 
revenues is likely to be difficult and politically fraught. Whatever balance is struck, providing clarity around the 
rules will enhance transparency for PES in the country. 
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3.3 Dedicated Tariffs 
Given sufficient political will and requisite legal 
authority, PES may be funded, wholly or in part, via 
revenues from resource usage fees or tariffs. Such 
fees or tariffs may be assessed on ecosystem service 
beneficiaries – such as water or electricity users, 
private developers, water or electricity companies, 
pharmaceutical companies, etc. – essentially creating 
a state-managed PES program based on mandatory contributions. Or fees or tariffs might come from an 
unrelated sector, but simply be diverted from general government revenues to specific PES purposes. This type 
of funding mechanism requires that the implementing government have necessary authority over planned 
taxes or fees and that implementation follows legal requirements. 
3.4 PES Risk Mitigation 
Where a government is interested in expanding or 
scaling up PES, it may invest in measures that reduce 
or mitigate risks for project participants or for a PES 
program. Key risks associated with PES projects 
include: 
• Leakage – the risk that negative ecosystem 
impacts will simply be displaced rather than 
mitigated or reversed overall. This is a systemic risk, though it may also be a risk for project participants 
to the extent that they are obligated to control leakage. 
• Permanence – the risk that ecosystem benefits that are meant to be realized over the long term are 
suddenly lost. 
• Project Performance – the risk that the project does not generate promised ecosystem services 
benefits due to poor design, intentional land conversion, encroachment on the project area, etc. 
Where these risks are too large, PES is unlikely to be an appropriate or effective instrument for achieving 
conservation goals. But where these risks are manageable, the government may provide support that reduces 
risks and related costs.  
Leakage, impermanence, and poor project performance undermine ecosystem service provision and therefore 
pose systemic risks, as well as risks to affected participants. The buyer may have paid for goods or services that 
can no longer be delivered, or the seller may not be able to recoup expenses out of future revenues. Either 
party might be obligated to offset the loss, perhaps by purchasing “replacement credits” if such instruments are 
available. In addition to these risks, PES participants also face risks that arise any commercial context, such as 
the risks of market fluctuation or unfavorable policy developments.   
To a greater or lesser degree, depending upon the context, PES risks can and should be managed by, and 
allocated between, project participants. However, a government that is interested in supporting PES can also 
provide or support risk mitigation and/or "pooling" of risk16
                                                          
16 Risk pooling describes a mechanism whereby many individuals contribute money or PES credits into a single account, or pool, and may 
make a withdrawal to recover after certain, pre-defined losses (e.g., due to natural disaster). Insurance relies upon pooling of risks, but this 
mechanism can also be used outside of formal insurance instruments. 
 to decrease participants’ exposure to risks that are 
outside of their control. 
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For example, the government might provide (or strengthen) a legal mechanism of servitudes or covenants 
attached to land to support long-term PES promises and associated benefits.17
                                                          
17 Greiber 2009. 
 Formal insurance mechanisms, 
which can in theory be used to mitigate the risk that ecosystem services will suddenly by lost due to natural 
disaster or other Act of God, might benefit from early-stage government support or incentives. The government 
might also create (or support the creation of) pooled reserve accounts for credits for ecosystem service 
generation, which would  provide a buffer in case of unintentional reversal of ecosystem service generation or 
leakage of negative ecosystem impacts beyond project boundaries. Pooling helps to lessen the impact and cost 
of risk mitigation measures (in this case by contributions to the reserve account) at the individual project level. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
Legal and institutional preparedness are key to successful, equitable PES. What this means in practice – i.e., 
what is needed and feasible, what steps should be prioritized, and what the process should be for reaching 
preparedness – will depend upon the context.  
Generally speaking, however, certain aspects can be considered threshold requirements for PES, such as the 
absence of a legal prohibition on these transactions, some level of supply and demand (which in turn requires 
minimum levels of governance and tenure rights), and a discernable regulatory regime. Beyond these threshold 
requirements, additional aspects of a supportive legal and institutional framework can be developed adaptively, 
alongside the growing experience with PES in the relevant jurisdiction. 
Initially, governments wishing to expand the use of PES may borrow practices and methodologies from 
established voluntary markets to establish guidelines, best practices, or even regulatory requirements related to 
PES transactions. Doing so can provide a useful starting point, which will be modified in light of changing 
conditions, needs, and experience, at relatively low cost. The voluntary carbon market has experienced the 
most standardization and systematization among markets for ecosystem services, making it a potentially rich 
source of technical information and guidelines that can be adapted to suit local needs. 
Also, removing perverse incentives and legal barriers is likely to be an important early step, to pave the way for 
positive interventions. Similarly, mapping and valuation of ecosystem services and ecological-economic priority 
setting will a key building block for PES activities. 
However, in outlining and discussing levels of legal and institutional readiness for PES, this booklet intends only 
to inform context-specific discussions of options and opportunities for governments to facilitate or encourage 
PES. The appropriate approach will vary significantly from country-to-country, or potentially even within a 
country. Needs will change from year to year. The framework provided here is therefore intended as a 
conversation starter, to flag important aspects of a supportive legal and institutional infrastructure for PES and 
to offer an analytical framework for approaching these issues, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.  
 
It is our hope that many new discussions are launched around investing in natural capital and the flow of 
ecosystem services.  
20 
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